Abstract: Within the nations of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Constitutional power of pardon, which has historically been defended as a tool of mercy and remedial justice, has become a site of administrative excess and constitutional tension. Despite being universally vested in the head of state, the region's use of this power often deviates from its humanitarian justification and serves as a politically useful instrument that erodes public trust in criminal justice systems, judicial finality, and equality before the law. The legislative framework enabling executive clemency in SAARC member states-India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, and Afghanistan is examined critically and comparably in this paper. Through a doctrinal analysis of recent and significant case laws such as A.G. Perarivalan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022, Bal Krishna Dhungel (Nepal), 2018 and contentious presidential pardons in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the study reveals recurring patterns of partisan misuse of mercy powers, arbitrariness, and opacity in jurisdictions lacking significant judicial or statutory constraints. The paper argues that constitutional democracies dedicated to upholding the rule of law, the current deference to executive discretion is normatively untenable. It contends that limited but principled judicial review, combined with procedural protections such as reason-giving, victim engagement, and independent clemency advisory procedures, is required to keep clemency from devolving into an instrument of impunity. The study concludes by suggesting a reform-oriented constitutional framework and regionally harmonized norms for recalibrating executive mercy within the parameters of legality, accountability, and democratic legitimacy.
